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FEDERAL REGULATION AND THE PROBLEM OF 
ADJUDICATION© 
MARCIA L. MCCORMICK* 
ABSTRACT 
After decades of deregulation, the United States seems to be entering a 
period of re-regulation, regulation to prevent harm that many activities might 
cause and also to create positive external benefits that those activities could 
yield, but might not without incentives.  Most regulatory programs in the 
United States provide a blend of measures designed to create these positive 
external benefits, promote good practices in the industry, prevent harms, and 
provide those harmed with remedies.  At a time in which we contemplate new 
ways to regulate to deal with the crises of the day and prevent the crises of 
tomorrow, this Article seeks to explore one piece of the solution, a piece not 
usually thought of as regulatory: adjudication.  Adjudication is often part of a 
broader regulatory web and is used both to deter harmful behavior and to 
remedy harmful behavior engaged in.  And it is used in a variety of contexts. 
To explore how we might construct federal agencies with greater 
adjudicatory power, I will use the regulation of equal employment opportunity 
as a case study. This Article analyzes the limits Article III may place on the 
structure of adjudicating agencies and ways those limits might be overcome.  It 
then explains the weaknesses of the current system to enforce the 
antidiscrimination laws and outlines a proposal for what an adjudicative 
agency designed to maximize the benefits from an agency perspective might 
look like.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Calls for increased regulation are flying fast and furious these days.  They 
are spurred by crises over the last couple of years in a relatively broad range of 
areas from the financial crisis, to tainted food, to defective consumer products, 
to consumer and worker exploitation, along with the looming new challenges 
like averting the worst consequences of global climate change, controlling the 
rise in healthcare costs, or protecting worker retirement plans as the workforce 
grows lopsidedly older.1  Regulatory reform even has significant pop culture 
 
 1. See, for example, the widespread outbreak of E-Coli from tainted peanuts, which led to a 
call for increased regulation of food safety, PBS NewsHour: Salmonella-Tainted Peanut Butter 
Raises Wider Health Concerns for FDA (PBS television broadcast Jan. 23, 2009), (transcript 
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/health/jan-june09/salmonella_01-23.html), and the 
hearings on safety problems with Toyota cars, Micheline Maynard, U.S. Studies A Backup For 
Brakes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2010, at B1 (reporting that at least one senator criticized the 
National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration for having failed to act).  Similarly, some 
have suggested that lack of regulation, or at least a lack of action by regulators, was responsible 
for the crash of the mortgage market and subsequent financial crisis from late 2007 to the present.  
See Richard A. Posner, Op-Ed, Our Crisis of Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2009, at A23 
(suggesting that regulators of the markets and banking industries “were asleep at the switch”); 
Catherine Rampell, Lax Oversight Caused Crisis, Bernanke Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2010, at 
A1; Nelson D. Schwartz & Floyd Norris, Reluctant Eye over Wall St., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 
2008, at A1 (reporting on responses to allegations of regulatory failure). 
  And the Obama administration has proposed both regulatory changes in existing 
agencies, and also entirely new agencies.  See, e.g., David Stout & Stephen Labaton, Vote Backs a 
Financial Oversight Body, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2009, at B3 (describing a bill to create a new 
consumer financial protection agency as well as changes to existing law to strengthen regulation 
of banks and trade in derivatives); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, U.S. Labor Department 
Rules To Improve Retirement Security Announced As Part of White House Middle Class Task 
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caché.  The comedy website Funny or Die and actors from Saturday Night Live 
who had all played presidents during those presidents’ administrations 
produced a video for The Main Street Brigade, a political consumer protection 
organization, in which former presidents urged President Obama to push for 
the Consumer Financial Protection Agency.2  New agencies are rarely the stuff 
of sketch comedy.  Meanwhile, in the background, scholars continue to study 
ways to regulate better and minimize any inappropriate interference with the 
market and with individual liberty, while promoting good policy and averting 
the disasters a lack of regulation can cause. 
We use regulation in the United States to prevent harm that various kinds 
of activities might cause and also to create positive external benefits that those 
activities could yield, but might not without incentives.  For example, we 
regulate the production of goods to prevent harm to the environment caused by 
the processes of production, to prevent harm to the consumers of those goods 
that use might cause, and to protect the health and safety of the workers who 
produce those goods.3  We also regulate the production of goods to promote 
distribution of the benefits that flow from their production and to distribute 
benefits the government might have to supply instead.4  So we regulate the 
number of hours a person can work and set a minimum level of pay.5  We also 
regulate the ways in which companies that produce goods interact with their 
 
Force’s Year-End Report (Feb. 26, 2010), http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/ebsa/EBSA 
20100251.htm (describing proposals to increase regulation of employee retirement plans); Press 
Release, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President on House 
Passage of the Health Insurance Industry Fair Competition Act (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.white 
house.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-house-passage-health-insurance-industry-fair-com 
petition-act (concerning legislation to regulate the business of health insurance); Commerce 
Department Proposes Establishment of NOAA Climate Service, NAT’L OCEANIC & 
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Feb. 8, 2010), http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2010/20100208_ 
climate.html (describing the establishment of a new National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration office to provide climate information for individuals, businesses, and 
communities). 
  And while I was writing this article, two massive reforms became law.  Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended 
by Health Care and Education Affordability Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 
124 Stat. 1029. 
 2. Funny or Die’s Presidential Reunion, FUNNY OR DIE, http://www.funnyordie.com/vide 
os/f5a57185bd/funny-or-die-s-presidential-reunion (last visited Oct. 11, 2011). 
 3. See 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006) (stating that the conditions causing Congress to enact the 
Toxic Substances Control Act included humans’ and the environment’s exposure to chemical 
substances and the dangers in producing such chemicals). 
 4. See 29 U.S.C. § 202 (2006) (stating that Congress found, in enacting the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, that minimum labor conditions were necessary to maintain the “minimum 
standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers”). 
 5. See id. §§ 206–07. 
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employees in a way that allows the employees to band together to better their 
working conditions and pay and to bring in more workers to receive the same 
benefits.6  Finally, we provide incentives for those companies to compensate 
employees in ways that promote their health (by providing health insurance), 
guard against wage loss that might come with an inability to work (by 
providing disability insurance), and save for retirement.7 
Most regulatory programs in the United States provide a blend of measures 
designed to create these positive external benefits, promote good practices in 
the industry, prevent harms, and provide those harmed with remedies.  At a 
time in which we contemplate new ways to regulate to deal with the crises of 
the day and prevent the crises of tomorrow, this Article seeks to explore one 
piece of the regulatory solution: adjudication.  Adjudication is used both to 
deter harmful behavior and to remedy harmful behavior engaged in.  And it is 
used in a variety of contexts. 
The traditional method of adjudication, using courts and the formal trial 
process, is rather expensive, which is one of the reasons that adjudication 
works as a deterrent.  But that expense means that using this aspect of 
regulation will be less attractive.  Still, it need not be.  Much of our federal 
regulation is done by administrative agencies, created to develop expertise in 
the area being regulated, to regulate more effectively, and to regulate in a more 
cost-effective manner.  Agencies could perform the adjudicatory function of 
regulation. 
Several agencies do perform adjudicatory functions, but adjudication by 
agencies has not been adopted wholesale for every area of regulation because 
of separation of powers concerns.  The Constitution places the judicial power 
of the United States in the judicial branch and requires that those who exercise 
the judicial power be given life tenure and salary protection.8  Thus, while 
Congress has the power to create agencies to enforce the laws,9 it may not have 
power to vest those agencies with the judicial power of the United States 
unless the adjudicators have life tenure and salary protection.10  So to the 
 
 6. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2006). 
 7. We create incentives through the federal tax code, for example.  Health insurance 
premiums are not taxed to the employee but are deductible by the employer as a business 
expense.  They are essentially a form of tax-free compensation.  Retirement benefits are not taxed 
to the employee until the employee draws on the funds, but they are deductible to the employer 
immediately.  For a description of this tax system, see S. REP. NO. 110-667, at 737–88, 865–89 
(2008). 
 8. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 9. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; id. art. III, § 1. 
 10. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 223 (5th ed. 2007); see also N. Pipeline 
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 59, 60, 87 (1982) (finding the bankruptcy 
court unconstitutional because judges without life tenure had jurisdiction over inherently judicial 
matters without adequate supervision of Article III judges). 
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extent that regulation through adjudication would require an exercise of the 
judicial power of the United States, we may need to tread carefully. 
To explore how we might construct agencies with greater adjudicatory 
power, I will use the regulation of equal employment opportunity as a case 
study.  As a preliminary matter, I recognize that we don’t usually talk about 
equal employment opportunity as something to be regulated.  Instead, we use 
the language of rights.  But this is an area in which we have used law 
instrumentally to change broader social norms and it focuses on how 
businesses operate.  Making rules for the conduct of commercial activity is 
regulation, and so regulation seems an apt description of the process that we 
are using to prevent the harm of discrimination and to remedy the harm 
discrimination causes. 
The regulation of employment discrimination makes a good case study for 
one more reason.  Employment discrimination laws in the United States have 
not created full equality in the workplace, and, in fact, progress on that front is 
viewed by many as having stalled, which makes it ripe for regulatory reform.  
If the rules we have are not working, we need to revisit those rules.  The 
federal government, particularly the legislative and executive branches, needs 
to take a more active role to vindicate the public interest, create accountability, 
and help promote equality in the private sector.  Agency adjudication could be 
one tool to accomplish these goals, and it could also be used in other areas to 
accomplish similar goals.  Thus, analyzing this area will tell us important 
things about the application of agency adjudication in other contexts as well. 
I will begin the exploration of the problem of agency adjudication by 
laying out the limits Article III may place on the structure of adjudicating 
agencies.  Then, in Part II, I will explain a bit more fully the weaknesses of the 
current system to enforce the antidiscrimination laws.  That section will outline 
my proposal for what an adjudicative agency designed to maximize the 
benefits of adjudication from an agency perspective would look like.  Part III 
will then discuss ways that the agency could be designed to minimize the 
constitutional objections while maximizing the benefits that agency 
adjudication is harnessed for. 
I.  ARTICLE III AND AGENCY DESIGN 
One reason that agency adjudication is used in only limited circumstances 
in the federal system is that the Constitution appears to limit the adjudicative 
function to judges who have life tenure and salary protection.  The Constitution 
states, 
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, 
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish.  The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their 
Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their 
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Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their 
Continuance in Office.11 
While this language might suggest that judicial power cannot be exercised at 
all by a tribunal whose judges lack life tenure and salary protections,12 
Congress has created tribunals staffed by judges without those protections 
since the earliest days of this country.13  The Supreme Court has validated the 
use of these legislative courts almost as long as they have existed.14  And most 
scholars agree that we could not now adopt any sort of literalist interpretation 
of this language.15 
One of the reasons that such an adoption would be impossible is that there 
is no bright line between adjudication of legal disputes and enforcement of the 
law.  An adjudication could be described as the application of law to facts in a 
way that binds an individual with an interest at stake.  But most enforcement of 
the law or legislative enactment requires similar application of law and policy 
to facts in a way that binds individuals with an interest at stake.16  While some 
actions are easy to identify as judicial, executive, or legislative, trying to 
articulate that difference clearly as a functional matter can be very difficult.  
Take for example a decision about who should get welfare benefits.  Is the 
decision about who is entitled to them a legislative, judicial, or executive 
decision?  You might say that the initial rules, the decision about whether to 
provide benefits at all or who generally should be entitled to benefits, are 
purely a policy choice and legislative.  Then a decision about whether a 
particular person meets those criteria, the application of the criteria to a 
specific instance, is adjudicative.  But that application might just as easily be 
considered executive—a process necessary to the execution of the program.  It 
might even still be seen as legislative in the sense that the ultimate question is 
whether the legislature intended that this person be entitled to benefits under 
these circumstances. 
 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 12. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 223. 
 13. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 
101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 919–20 (1988). 
 14. See Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828) (holding 
constitutional the use of legislative courts). 
 15. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and 
Administrative Courts Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 239 (1990); Fallon, supra note 13, at 
916, 919. 
 16. See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers 
Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 618–19 (2001); Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political 
Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 561 (2007); V. F. Nourse, Toward a New Constitutional 
Anatomy, 56 STAN. L. REV. 835, 859 (2004); David Orentlicher, Conflicts of Interest and the 
Constitution, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 713, 726–27 (2002). 
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The difficulty of distinguishing among the judicial, legislative, and 
executive powers ensures that no rigid rule can be articulated to describe with 
precision what matters must, as a constitutional matter, be determined by the 
judicial branch.  While in principle we describe the separation of powers as if 
there is a distinct line around the functions of each branch, in practice, that line 
is fuzzy, at best.  The more federal regulation we have, the fuzzier the lines get. 
And so Congress has created and the Supreme Court has approved the use 
of legislative courts in several areas.  For the most part, their constitutionality 
depends on either a category of historical use, or the nature or source of the 
interest at stake and the level of control by an Article III court.17  As a 
historical matter, legislative courts have been permissible for U.S. possessions 
or territories, regardless of the subject matter of the dispute.18  Military courts, 
which try and punish offenses by members of the armed forces while they are 
in active service, have also been permissible.19  Additionally, military tribunals 
for those engaged in war against the United States may sometimes be 
allowed.20 
 
 17. Nelson, supra note 16, at 562–63 (distinguishing between public rights and private rights 
and noting the level of Article III court involvement necessary for each).  Some scholars have 
suggested that this approach which seeks to determine the permissible jurisdiction of legislative 
courts by the category of right at stake is not fully accepted by the Supreme Court and lacks 
coherent boundaries.  See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 332–33 (6th ed. 2009); Daniel J. Meltzer, 
Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2537, 2571 (1998); Martin H. 
Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 
DUKE L.J. 197, 204–05 (1983); Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Shoring Up Article 
III: Legislative Court Doctrine in the Post CFTC v. Schor Era, 68 B.U. L. REV. 85, 111–20 
(1988).  Professor Nelson demonstrates the underlying logic in historical terms and explains its 
continuing vitality in the Court’s jurisprudence, however.  See Nelson, supra note 16. 
 18. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 224–29.  Nelson suggests that the reason for this is that 
the territorial courts do not exercise the power of the “whole” United States, but only the power 
of their territory.  Nelson, supra note 16, at 575–76. 
 19. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 230–33. 
 20. Id. at 233–36; see Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (holding that a military 
commission could try German nationals for war crimes in Germany without any Article III 
oversight); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (allowing a military tribunal to try German 
saboteurs in the United States for violations of the law of war).  Most recently, Congress created a 
military commission to try those held outside of the United States for terrorism or aiding 
terrorism.  Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, title X, §108, 119 Stat. 
2739, 2740–44; Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.  The 
Supreme Court has held most recently that military detainees must have access to Article III 
courts to challenge their detention, or the military tribunal must provide most of the key due 
process protections that are available in federal courts.  See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 
2274 (2008) (holding that the procedures provided by the Detainee Treatment Act are not a 
sufficient substitute for habeas corpus relief in an Article III court and that the Article III review 
was insufficient). 
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Aside from these special courts, traditionally, Congress could create 
legislative courts to adjudicate what are considered to be public rights.21  
Public rights are those created by the federal government or held by the federal 
government in trust for the benefit of all of us.22  Expenditures of money from 
the public treasury, or entitlements, are classic examples.23  Thus, public rights 
disputes usually involve non-criminal disputes between the government and 
private parties in which core private rights of life, liberty, and property are not 
at stake.24 
The logic behind this principle was that where Congress has the discretion 
to create the substantive right, it has the ability to shape that right, and to allow 
it to be abrogated by congressional action without direct judicial oversight.25  
Similarly, where Congress has created a right, it has the discretion to allow (or 
not allow) parties to sue the government over that right, and having allowed 
that, may dictate what shape that litigation must take.26 
Contrasted with these public rights disputes are private right disputes.  
Private rights include core rights to life, liberty, and property, but more 
broadly, those rights held by individuals, and not by the public at large.27  Your 
average tort case is a private right dispute, involving two private parties, 
concerning a right established by common law or state statute, and seeking 
liability and damages for past acts.28  Disputes over private rights “lie at the 
 
 21. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69–70, 70 n.24 (1982) 
(plurality opinion). 
 22. See Nelson, supra note 16, at 566. 
 23. Id. at 570. 
 24. Id. at 569–72; see N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 70 n.24 (plurality opinion). 
 25. See Nelson, supra note 16, at 570–72; see also, N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 80–81 (plurality 
opinion) (determining that Congress has the power, upon creating a substantive federal right to 
prescribe the manner of adjudicating that right). 
 26. See Nelson, supra note 16, at 582–84; see also N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 80 (plurality 
opinion) (“[Congress] possesses substantial discretion to prescribe the manner in which that right 
may be adjudicated . . . .”).  Even when a plaintiff had a core private right at stake—where a 
person sued to redress an injury to liberty or property—the matter could be handled without 
judicial involvement because the government itself had not actually injured the person, but was 
simply indemnifying the government official who had.  Nelson, supra note 16, at 584.  This 
rationale is in line with sovereign immunity jurisprudence more generally.  See Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 388 (1971) (implying a 
private right of action to sue federal officials for injuries caused in violation of federal law or the 
Constitution); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–56, 167 (1908) (holding that a state official 
could be sued for prospective injunctive relief for violations of the law because the state itself 
could not violate the law); cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (holding that 
government officers could be sued for damages for injuring a person in violation of federal law or 
the Constitution), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 
(1978). 
 27. Nelson, supra note 16, at 567. 
 28. See N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 69–70 (plurality opinion). 
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core of the historically recognized judicial power.”29  Thus, these disputes 
require significant oversight by an Article III court.30  Still, even where private 
rights are at stake, non-Article III actors can exercise significant adjudicatory 
power.31 
In addition to the type of interest at stake, the legitimacy of political branch 
adjudication depends on the manner and extent to which the non-judicial actor 
can bind individuals.  This depends on two things: (1) whether the agency 
action is forward or backward looking; and (2) whether the non-judicial actor’s 
decision is self-executing. 
Congress has significantly broader power to create obligations reaching 
into the future and very little power to attach new consequences to past acts.32  
It is primarily the judiciary that has the latter power.  Thus, litigation about the 
amount of social security benefits a person might be entitled to in the future 
can take place entirely in a legislative court, but challenges to the 
constitutionality of an action taken by the Social Security Administration 
might need more oversight by an Article III court. 
Whether the non-judicial actor’s decision is self-executing is really more 
of a mechanism for ensuring a goodly amount of Article III court supervision.  
If the prevailing party needs to take the agency’s decision to a federal court in 
order to have the decision enforced, that court will be able to review the 
grounds of the decision, the processes followed to reach it, and the evidence 
before the decision maker.  This process may allow more reaching review by 
the federal judiciary than ordinary administrative or appellate review, in which 
the courts are often required to be very deferential to fact-finding, 
 
 29. Id. at 70 (plurality opinion). 
 30. Id. at 77 (plurality opinion).  The extent of that oversight has been the subject of much 
scholarly debate.  See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 13 (proposing that appellate review by Article III 
courts be sufficient on something of a sliding scale depending upon the interests at stake); Nelson, 
supra note 16, at 609–13 (summarizing the current state of the law classifying whether Article III 
oversight is necessary and to what extent based on the type of right at issue); James E. Pfander, 
Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 643, 689–97 (2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court must have some sort of oversight over 
agency adjudication); Redish, supra note 17, at 208–09, 226–27 (arguing that matters listed in 
Article III section 2 must get fairly searching review in an Article III court); Saphire & Solimine, 
supra note 17, at 139–44 (arguing that ordinary administrative review with de novo review of the 
law and something like substantial evidence review of the facts must be available in an Article III 
court for any agency adjudication). 
 31. See Nelson, supra note 16, at 625 (discussing how Congress and the Executive do not 
need to use “judicial” power to adjudicate many private interests). 
 32. See Nelson, supra note 16, at 562, 595–98; see also Ann Woolhandler, Public Rights, 
Private Rights, and Statutory Retroactivity, 94 GEO. L.J. 1015, 1023–27 (2006) (discussing the 
prohibition of retroactive legislation on private rights). 
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interpretation of the law, and application of the law to the facts.33  
Additionally, if Article III courts have supervisory authority over the non-
judicial actor, they will have even more control over the content of the 
decision. 
While these lines on the nature of the right at stake and the manner in 
which relief is provided are helpful, the most recent Supreme Court decisions 
on the issue have not focused on them as explicitly as it had previously.  A bit 
of history here might be helpful. 
A. The Supreme Court’s Article I Adjudication Decisions 
The Court has several times considered cases in which non-Article III 
actors have been given the power to adjudicate, or to participate in the 
adjudication, of what have traditionally been considered private right claims—
claims of life, liberty, or “old” property, which include property rights long 
recognized in tangible and intangible things, as opposed to “new” property, 
which refers to governmental entitlements, services, and licenses.34  And while 
these cases do allocate particular matters and types of decisions to Article I 
decision makers or Article III decision makers by considering the factors laid 
out above, a more detailed analysis of the cases reveals the nuances of those 
factors and how they interact. 
1. Crowell v. Benson: Setting the Stage 
In the first of these cases to go beyond the traditional categories, Crowell v. 
Benson, the Court was asked to consider whether an administrative agency 
could be given the power to decide workers’ compensation disputes for 
workers injured in maritime accidents.35  Such workers were not covered by 
state workers’ compensation laws because maritime accidents were covered by 
maritime law, and thus, exclusively federal.36  The agency actor, the deputy 
 
 33. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2529–
30 (2007) (applying the deferential “arbitrary and capricious” standard to an Environmental 
Protection Agency action). 
 34. The label and analysis of this new kind of property comes from Charles A. Reich, The 
New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).  Both Professors Fallon and Nelson have recognized that 
old and new property have been treated differently by the Court in this area, with adjudication of 
rights related to new property receiving less Article III involvement.  See Fallon, supra note 13, at 
952, 966–67 (using the term “right” to talk about things generally considered old property and the 
term “privilege” to talk about at least some new property and arguing, however, that the 
distinction between rights and privileges has been eroded and many privileges should get greater 
Article III court protection); Nelson, supra note 16, at 606; see also Stephen F. Williams, Liberty 
and Property: The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 3, 11–13 (1983) 
(discussing Reich’s approach). 
 35. 285 U.S. 22, 37 (1932). 
 36. See id. at 37–41. 
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commissioner of the United States Employees’ Compensation Commission, 
was empowered to hold hearings and decide whether compensation was owed 
under the terms of the statute and if so, in what amount.37  The deputy 
commissioner’s order was self-executing, in the sense that it was final; it could 
be set aside on application to a federal district court within thirty days, but 
payment would proceed as ordered unless the federal court stayed the payment 
on the ground that the employer would suffer irreparable damage.38  The order 
was not wholly self-executing, in the sense that the commissioner lacked the 
power to compel action by an employer who refused to comply.  If the 
employer refused to comply, the beneficiary of an award had to apply for 
enforcement to a federal district court, which would decide whether the order 
“was made and served in accordance with law” and which would issue a 
mandatory injunction if it was.39 
The Court determined that this matter, “liability of one individual to 
another under the law as defined” was a matter of private right.40  But that fact 
alone did not mean that all matters related to the decision-making process be 
handled by an Article III judge. 
[I]n cases of that sort, there is no requirement that, in order to maintain the 
essential attributes of the judicial power, all determinations of fact in 
constitutional courts shall be made by judges. . . . In cases of equity and 
admiralty, it is historic practice to call to the assistance of the courts, without 
the consent of the parties, masters and commissioners or assessors, to pass 
upon certain classes of questions, as, for example, to take and state an account 
or to find the amount of damages.  While the reports of masters and 
commissioners in such cases are essentially of an advisory nature, it has not 
been the practice to disturb their findings when they are properly based upon 
evidence, in the absence of errors of law, and the parties have no right to 
demand that the court shall redetermine the facts thus found.41 
Moreover, the scope of the agency’s jurisdiction was quite narrow, “confined 
to the relation of master and servant, and the method of determining the 
questions of fact, which arise in the routine of making compensation awards to 
employees under the Act, is necessary to its effective enforcement.  The Act 
itself . . . establishes the measure of the employer’s liability . . . .”42  The 
agency’s function was rather mechanical, and tightly linked to the 
administration of the program. 
 
 37. Id. at 42–44. 
 38. Id. at 44–45. 
 39. Id. at 45. 
 40. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51. 
 41. Id. at 51–52 (footnote omitted). 
 42. Id. at 54. 
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Thus, for at least some kinds of cases, non-judicial decision makers can be 
used by the Article III court to manage litigation and do a preliminary finding 
of facts, which judges need review only to gauge whether they are “based on 
evidence” and made in the absence of errors of law.  In other words, 
administrative adjudicators can decide what really happened in the underlying 
dispute.  But the effects of that decision go one step further.  At least for fact-
intensive questions, administrative adjudicators get to decide, or at least get the 
first stab at, what the end result of the dispute should be upon application of 
the law they are charged with enforcing to these facts. 
The Court did place some limitations on the kinds of decisions that would 
receive this much deference.  Questions related to the validity of the statute 
being enforced, its constitutionality, for example, or whether the statute applied 
to the situation at issue, had to be determined by the Article III court de novo.43  
The mechanism of review for these types of decisions, a suit in equity, ensured 
that parties could plead and prove with evidence before the district court that 
the statute was invalid or did not apply.44 
The Court applied the reasoning in Crowell to validate the use of 
magistrates, non-Article III judges, in dispositive matters in criminal cases, 
which are also private rights matters because they involve rights to life and 
liberty, in United States v. Raddatz.45  The mechanism of review of magistrate 
decisions is even more direct: a magistrate issues a report and recommendation 
on the matter to be decided, and the district court decides how much weight to 
give, if any, to any part objected to by a party.46  The district court judge can 
receive further evidence or send the matter back to the magistrate with 
instructions.47  Moreover, the control of the case as a whole is more direct—the 
case is filed with the district court, and the district court judge decides whether 
to refer particular matters to a magistrate, or the parties can consent to having a 
magistrate conduct the proceedings and enter final orders.48  Additionally, the 
control of the magistrates themselves is within the judicial branch: Article III 
judges appoint magistrates for fixed terms and set their salaries.49 
2. Northern Pipeline: Stumbling Towards a Test 
The Court invalidated adjudication by non-Article III decision makers in 
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., which struck 
 
 43. See id. at 60–63. 
 44. Id. at 46, 63–64. 
 45. 447 U.S. 667, 682–83 (1980). 
 46. Id. at 673–74 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)). 
 47. Id. at 674 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)). 
 48. See 28 U.S.C. § 636 (2006). 
 49. Id. §§ 631, 634. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] FEDERAL REGULATION AND THE PROBLEM OF ADJUDICATION 51 
down the Bankruptcy Act of 1978.50  That Act created a system of bankruptcy 
judges to adjudicate all civil proceedings arising under the bankruptcy title or 
“arising in or related to cases under title 11.”51  That broad grant meant that the 
bankruptcy judge could hear a wide variety of claims: 
suits to recover accounts, controversies involving exempt property, actions to 
avoid transfers and payments as preferences or fraudulent conveyances, and 
causes of action owned by the debtor at the time of the petition for bankruptcy.  
The bankruptcy courts can hear claims based on state law as well as those 
based on federal law. 
  The judges of the bankruptcy courts are vested with all of the “powers of a 
court of equity, law, and admiralty,” except that they “may not enjoin another 
court or punish a criminal contempt not committed in the presence of the judge 
of the court or warranting a punishment of imprisonment.”  In addition to this 
broad grant of power, Congress has allowed bankruptcy judges the power to 
hold jury trials, to issue declaratory judgments, to issue writs of habeas corpus 
under certain circumstances, to issue all writs necessary in aid of the 
bankruptcy court’s expanded jurisdiction, and to issue any order, process or 
judgment that is necessary or appropriate . . . .52 
The decision yielded no majority opinion, but a majority of the judges held that 
allowing non-Article III decision makers such broad jurisdiction over 
inherently judicial matters, particularly state law matters, and such broad 
powers to act without supervision, in the sense of prior approval or searching 
review, by Article III courts violated Article III and the principle of separation 
of powers.53  The plurality’s opinion focused on the traditional categories in 
which legislative courts had been recognized, stated that those categories 
should not be expanded, and would have found that this delegation was 
unconstitutional because it did not fit any of the traditional categories.54  The 
concurrence did not agree that the categorical approach urged by the plurality 
was a wholly accurate summary of prior cases, but did agree that more Article 
III oversight was necessary.55 
3. Thomas v. Union Carbide and Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission v. Schor: Converging on an Approach 
The two most recent cases the Supreme Court has decided were very 
similar to each other and related to areas heavily regulated by federal law: the 
licensing and labeling of pesticides and the regulation of the commodities 
 
 50. 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982). 
 51. Id. at 54 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (Supp. 1976)). 
 52. Id. at 54–55 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
 53. Id. at 73–76, 83–87 (plurality opinion); id. at 91–92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
 54. Id. at 63–64, 70–76 (plurality opinion). 
 55. N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 91–92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
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markets.56  The statute at issue in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural 
Products allowed companies seeking to register a pesticide to piggyback on a 
prior company’s research to demonstrate the health, safety, and environmental 
effects of the product.57  The follow-on company had to pay compensation to 
the initial company, and the statute created a system of binding arbitration, 
with very limited review in the federal courts, to determine the appropriate 
level of compensation.58  Several companies that had done initial research and 
that felt the compensation awarded was too low challenged the system, arguing 
that decisions about their rights to property had to be made with much more 
involvement by Article III courts.59 
The Supreme Court disagreed, however.  The Court rejected the argument 
that any dispute between private parties was automatically a “private rights” 
dispute or that the right to compensation was a state common law right.60  
While there may be some private right characteristics in the statutory right to 
compensation—the initial company might be said to have some type of 
property right in its research—the statutory right also had public right 
characteristics—use of the data serves the public purpose of safeguarding 
public health.61  Additionally, there had never actually been a recognized 
property right in this type of information.  While there is a property right in 
research that falls under trade secrets doctrine, that right exists only while the 
information is kept secret.62  Because the research had to be disclosed to the 
agency for the pesticides to be sold to the public, the research was no longer 
secret, and no common law or state statute recognized a property interest in 
that information any more.63  Moreover, underlying this reasoning was broader 
context—the system regulating the sale of these dangerous chemicals: there 
was no freestanding unfettered property right to sell products potentially 
dangerous to the public health and the environment.  In other words, there was 
an ex ante barrier to the sale in the first place.64 
 
 56. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 835–36 (1986); Thomas 
v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 571 (1985). 
 57. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 571. 
 58. Id. at 573–74.  The federal courts could review the arbitrator’s findings and 
determination only for fraud, misconduct, or misrepresentation.  Id.  They also could review any 
constitutional challenges, however.  Id. at 592. 
 59. Id. at 584–85. 
 60. Id. at 584–86. 
 61. Id. at 589. 
 62. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 584. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1020 (1984) (analyzing the statutes at 
issue and holding the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act not to constitute an 
uncompensated taking that would violate the Fifth Amendment). 
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Resolving the issue, the Court held that “Congress . . . may create a 
seemingly ‘private’ right that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory 
scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited 
involvement by the Article III judiciary.”65  The import of the Court’s ruling 
might also be to suggest that if there would be no right but for Congress’ 
creation, the right/privilege distinction highlighted by Professors Fallon and 
Nelson,66 then there is no right sufficiently private, or no matter inherently 
judicial enough, to require extensive Article III involvement. 
In the most recent case on the subject, Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission v. Schor,67 the statute at issue also related to a field highly 
regulated by Congress, with ex ante barriers to entry, but the issue that could 
be decided by the non-Article III decision maker was not quite as narrow.  The 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) had jurisdiction to 
adjudicate claims brought by customers against brokers for violations of the 
Commodity Exchange Act or the CFTC’s regulations.68  There was also a 
permissive counterclaim regulation: the CFTC could adjudicate counterclaims, 
including state law counterclaims, arising out of the transactions or 
occurrences set forth in the complaint.69  The jurisdiction over counterclaims 
was not exclusive; the counterclaim did not have to be raised in this 
proceeding, but could be raised in other fora.70  And the final agency decision 
was subject to review in federal circuit court, but the review was ordinary 
administrative review, not very searching.71 
A customer brought an action within the CFTC against his broker, alleging 
that a debit balance in his account was caused by the broker’s violations of the 
Act.72  The broker brought a diversity action in federal district court seeking to 
recover that debit balance, and the customer counterclaimed that the debit was 
caused by the violations of the Act.73  The customer twice moved in the federal 
court to stay or dismiss the action as duplicative of the CFTC proceedings, and 
so the broker voluntarily dismissed the district court action and brought the 
action to recover the balance as a counterclaim to the customer’s agency 
action.74  When the customer lost, he challenged the agency’s decision, and the 
Court of Appeals, sua sponte, raised the question of whether the CFTC’s 
 
 65. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 593–94. 
 66. Fallon, supra note 13, at 966–67; Nelson, supra note 16, at 566–67. 
 67. 478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
 68. Id. at 836. 
 69. Id. at 837. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See id. at 838–39. 
 72. Schor, 478 U.S. at 837. 
 73. Id. at 837–38. 
 74. Id. at 838. 
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jurisdiction over the counterclaim, which arose under state law, was 
constitutional.75 
Unlike in Thomas, the right at stake for the customer and for the broker 
was a traditional common law right, and the Supreme Court recognized that the 
“private rights” nature of the counterclaim was significant to the analysis.76  
However, the Court held that the private rights nature of the claim was not 
determinative.77  Article III is not solely concerned with protecting the private 
rights of individuals78 in the Court’s view; rather Article III seeks to protect the 
interests of the judicial branch itself, reserving the judicial branch’s appropriate 
structural role as a check on the executive and legislative branches, and only to 
a lesser extent does Article III protect individual rights, primarily through 
those same checks.79 
With this structural interest as the touchstone, the Court established a 
combination balancing and threshold test to take account of those two interests.  
The balancing part requires a court to look to the scope of the agency’s 
jurisdiction.80  When agency adjudication is subject to ordinary review, it will 
be constitutional as long as the subject-matter jurisdiction of the agency does 
not encroach too far into the regular work of the judicial branch.81  And the 
threshold test focused on the individual right to an independent judiciary.82  As 
long as the parties consented to adjudication before the agency, then this right 
would not be injured.83 
Applying the new test to the case before it, the Court upheld the CFTC’s 
decision.84  Because the CFTC’s jurisdiction over state law counterclaims was 
very narrow—those claims had to arise in connection with commodities 
brokerage accounts, an area of law that was highly regulated by Congress—the 
power to adjudicate the claims did not encroach very far into the regular work 
of the judicial branch.85  And because the parties consented to having the 
agency adjudicate the claim, they had waived any individual interest they may 
have had in having an Article III court adjudicate the claim.86 
 
 75. Id. at 838–39. 
 76. Id. at 853. 
 77. Schor, 478 U.S. at 853, 855–57. 
 78. For a discussion of the personal right to an independent judicial forum, see id. at 848–50. 
 79. Id. at 848, 850–52. 
 80. Id. at 851. 
 81. Id. at 851–52. 
 82. Schor, 478 U.S. at 848–49. 
 83. Id. at 849–50. 
 84. Id. at 857. 
 85. Id. at 852–53. 
 86. Id. at 849–50. 
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B. Synthesizing the Whole Mess 
Thus, there are a number of lines that need to be drawn to map out the 
appropriate role for an administrative agency in any kind of enforcement 
scheme, any one of which could be the starting point for analysis.  First, 
assuming no concurrent jurisdiction, which is likely relatively rare, what are 
the mechanism and scope of Article III courts’ control over the agency 
process?  Non-judicial determinations that require some kind of positive action 
in the federal court or direct appeal as of right with de novo review will tend to 
provide the most oversight of the process for decision.  At the same time, the 
courts provide a mechanism for waiver of that review, essentially consent to 
the non-Article III adjudication, by anyone not seeking enforcement or direct 
appeal.  Giving Article III judges supervisory control in a human resources 
sense will provide for even more direct oversight and will allow for corrections 
where infringement goes beyond the individual interests in Article III 
adjudication and into the structural interests of the federal courts, in Schor’s 
terms.  Appointments by the executive branch and ordinary administrative 
review, on the other hand, will provide for the least amount of oversight, and 
will make sense when there is little structural interest at stake. 
If there is little Article III oversight, only ordinary administrative review, 
for example, the other question to be asked is, are the rights potentially at stake 
public rights or private rights?  Only in private rights cases need there be 
Article III oversight, and even in private rights cases, non-judicial actors can 
decide some matters with little oversight.  The amount of oversight seems to 
depend on the scope of the subject-matter jurisdiction and the type of private 
rights potentially at stake.87  In all of the cases, the scope of the non-judicial 
actor’s subject-matter jurisdiction was relevant.88  The more narrow the 
jurisdiction, the more likely review could be deferential and the less direct 
need be the supervision of the non-judicial actor’s day-to-day work by the 
Article III court.  That is the structural interest the Court refers to in Schor.89  
And, the type of private right at stake also matters here.  Decisions about life, 
liberty, and property recognized at common law need significant oversight, 
either because they are core private rights or because as core private rights, 
they are inherently judicial matters and taking them from the courts will work a 
substantial institutional injury. 
Another way to look at the public or private rights distinction is whether 
the contemplated agency action is forward looking or backward looking.  A 
determination of liability, looking backward on past acts, is more likely to 
impact a private right and requires significant Article III involvement.  A cease 
 
 87. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 853–54. 
 88. See supra notes 53, 80–81 and accompanying text. 
 89. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
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and desist order limiting permissible conduct in the future is essentially just 
like Congress declaring a particular practice to be impermissible now and into 
the future, and thus, requires much less Article III oversight.90  It also, in most 
cases, won’t involve any sort of private right unless the cease and desist order 
is so broad as to be confiscatory. 
This flowchart illustrates how the analysis plays out. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With this analysis set out, we’ll turn now to an explanation of why agency 
adjudication is a potentially attractive regulatory option in the employment 
discrimination context, and then apply the analysis to that context to highlight 
the constitutional difficulties agency adjudication might pose and the design 
solutions that would avoid these problems. 
II.  THE CASE FOR A NEW AGENCY STRUCTURE 
As I explained more fully in a prior article, two somewhat interrelated 
reasons that the employment discrimination laws are not as effective as they 
could be are what I have called the enforcement gap and the secrecy problem, 
both of which are caused by an overreliance on adjudication without support 
from other regulatory tools.91  This part will explain what those problems are 
and how reliance on private adjudication causes them. 
I will start with the enforcement gap, which simply refers to the fact that 
our laws prohibiting discrimination are not being fully enforced.  The existence 
 
 90. See Nelson, supra note 16, at 596–97. 
 91. Marcia L. McCormick, The Truth Is Out There: Revamping Federal Antidiscrimination 
Enforcement for the Twenty-First Century, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 193, 207–22 (2009). 
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of this gap is demonstrated by the failure of Title VII and the other 
employment discrimination statutes92 to substantially eliminate employment 
discrimination.93  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the main tool 
designed to create equality at work, has been in effect for more than forty 
years—more than two generations.94  And while Title VII and laws patterned 
on it that protect additional groups have helped to make a difference for many, 
the United States is not yet in a position to say that it has achieved equality.  In 
fact, scholars are becoming ever more vocal about the lack of racial and gender 
equality in the workforce under almost any measure: employment rates, wages, 
job integration, and labor force participation.95  And while some people have 
argued that Title VII has eliminated most overt discrimination,96 others have 
contradicted that, pointing, for example, to large class actions brought against 
 
 92. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006), 
prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, and sex.  
Id. § 2000e-2(a).  Several other statutes also prohibit discrimination.  One such statute prohibits 
discrimination in contracts, including at-will employment, on the basis of race. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 
(2006).  The Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.), prohibits discrimination in compensation on the basis of sex.  
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified 
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2006)), prohibits discrimination on the basis of age.  
Similarly Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, tit. I, 104 
Stat. 327, 330–37 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–17 (2006)), prohibits employment 
discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities.  Sections 501 and 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, tit. V, §§ 501, 504, 87 Stat. 355, 390–91, 394 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(a) (2006)), also prohibit discrimination, including 
in employment, against those with disabilities, but only for recipients of federal funds.  Likewise, 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VI, 78 Stat. 241, 252–53 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7 (2006)), prohibits discrimination, including in 
employment, on the basis of race by recipients of federal funds, and Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, tit. IX, § 901, 86 Stat. 335, 373–74 (codified as 
amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006)), prohibits discrimination, including in employment, on the 
basis of gender by recipients of federal funds.  Finally, the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, 
Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, 2611–19 (2006)), 
requires that family and medical leave be provided to employees regardless of gender. 
 93. McCormick, supra note 91, at 207. 
 94. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17. 
 95. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 
94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 2 & nn.3 & 5–6 (2006); R. Richard Banks, Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Lee 
Ross, Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 
1184 (2006); Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Toward a New Civil Rights Framework, 30 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 353, 353–54 (2007); Rachel F. Moran, Whatever Happened to Racism?, 79 ST. JOHN’S 
L. REV. 899, 900 (2005). 
 96. See, e.g., Bell & Howell Co. v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 136, 146 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (stating 
that “in most instances Title VII has eliminated the more obvious and explicit forms of 
discrimination”); John J. Donohue III & James J. Heckman, Re-Evaluating Federal Civil Rights 
Policy, 79 GEO. L.J. 1713, 1713–14, 1729 (1991); Ronald Turner, Thirty Years of Title VII’s 
Regulatory Regime: Rights, Theories, and Realities, 46 ALA. L. REV. 375, 480 (1995). 
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big companies for expressly racist and sexist behavior.97  Michael Selmi, for 
example, has gone so far as to label the form of discrimination alleged in these 
current cases “seventies-style” discrimination.98  In two generations, we should 
have gotten past the seventies.  The system is not working as well as it should. 
The system does not work as well as it should because the 
antidiscrimination norm is unsettled, and the method of enforcing our ban on 
employment discrimination is not suited to work social change.  For the system 
to work, we need greater public information and greater opportunities to work 
towards consensus.  To accomplish that goal, I have proposed that we create a 
federal agency designed to make public employee and applicant allegations of 
discrimination, investigations of charges of discrimination, and adjudication of 
such claims.  Additionally, because of the national public interest in removing 
discrimination entirely from the workplace, a federal agency with greater 
regulatory power must also have the power to impose sanctions on offending 
employers. 
Although there are federal agencies with some power to enforce our laws 
that prohibit employment discrimination,99 the primary enforcement 
mechanism is the ex ante mechanism of a private right of action for injunctive 
relief or damages against an employer,100 and this is what has led to the 
enforcement gap.  Private litigation is a poor enforcement tool for a number of 
 
 97. See, e.g., Nancy Levit, Megacases, Diversity, and the Elusive Goal of Workplace 
Reform, 49 B.C. L. REV. 367, 367–68 (2008) (noting the increase in employment discrimination 
class-action suits and the resulting multimillion dollar settlements); Michael Selmi, Sex 
Discrimination in the Nineties, Seventies Style: Case Studies in the Preservation of Male 
Workplace Norms, 9 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 1, 3 (2005) (arguing that class-action 
discrimination suits suggest that discrimination is still present in the labor market). 
 98. Selmi, supra note 97. 
 99. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has some power to enforce 
our employment discrimination laws.  The EEOC adjudicates claims against federal employers, 
and for private sector charges; it can investigate, seek conciliation, or bring an action in federal 
court.  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, 2000e-16 (2006).  Employers with more than 
100 employees are required to submit demographic data to the EEOC, as well, and that could lead 
to investigations or an action in federal court.  Id. § 2000e-8(c); 29 C.F.R. § 1602.7 (2010).  The 
Department of Labor’s Office of Contract Compliance Programs can require employers not to 
discriminate as a condition of accepting a contract with the federal government.  See U.S. 
COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FUNDING FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT: THE PRESIDENT’S 
2006 REQUEST ch. 3 (Sept. 2005), available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/crfund06/crfund 
06.pdf.  As part of that power, it can enforce those contractual provisions by conducting 
compliance evaluations and complaint investigations, obtaining conciliation agreements, 
monitoring contractors’ progress through periodic compliance reports, recommending 
enforcement actions to the Solicitor of Labor, and debarring a company’s federal contracts plus 
obtaining backpay and other relief for employees.  Id. 
 100. See McCormick, supra note 91, at 205–06, 208 (contrasting the number of charges 
brought to the EEOC and the number of private actions brought in federal court with the number 
of actions filed by the EEOC). 
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reasons.  Many employees do not know their rights or do not realize they have 
been discriminated against.101  Many who know their rights do not pursue 
them; they might still be working for the employer and may fear retaliation.102  
They may also fear that they would be labeled a troublemaker by other 
employers and become essentially unemployable.103  Furthermore, even where 
employees pursue their rights, they are rarely successful in federal court.104  
And even when employees are successful, the remedies imposed rarely create 
the kinds of structural changes that will help prevent discrimination by the 
employer or other employers in the future.105 
Reliance on private litigation also leads to suppression of information 
about allegations of discrimination.  I have labeled this the secrecy problem.106  
The secrecy problem is caused in large part by channeling disputes into tracks 
alternative to the public trial.  Alternative dispute resolution is not a public 
 
 101. Cheryl R. Kaiser & Brenda Major, A Social Psychological Perspective on Perceiving 
and Reporting Discrimination, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 801, 804–06 (2006) (reporting that 
many people do not accurately perceive when they have been discriminated against). 
 102. Sally Riggs Fuller, Lauren B. Edelman & Sharon F. Matusik, Legal Readings: Employee 
Interpretation and Mobilization of Law, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 200, 208 (2000) (summarizing 
literature). 
 103. Nantiya Ruan, Bringing Sense to Incentives: An Examination of Incentive Payments to 
Named Plaintiffs in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 10 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 
395, 396–97, 410–11 (2006); see also KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE 
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMS 26–29 (1988) (reporting on a 1980 study by the Civil 
Litigation Research Project). 
 104. For example, few cases go to trial.  E.g., Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary 
Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71, 120 (1999) (suggesting 
that only ten percent of employment discrimination cases go to trial); Kevin M. Clermont & 
Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 440–41, 444 (2004) (suggesting that seventy percent of 
employment discrimination cases settle and plaintiffs win just over four percent of pretrial 
adjudications).  When they do go to trial, few cases are resolved in favor of employees.  Kevin M. 
Clermont et al., How Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts of 
Appeals, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 547, 556–58, 566 (2003) [hereinafter Clermont et al., How 
Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare] (finding that cases decided in favor of plaintiffs are 
six times more likely to be reversed than those found in favor of defendants); Michael Selmi, 
Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 
283–84, 309 (1997) [hereinafter Selmi, Proving Discrimination] (arguing that meritorious cases 
are lost or reversed on appeal); Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So 
Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 558, 560 (2001) [hereinafter Selmi, Hard to Win] (asserting 
that employers prevail in ninety-eight percent of federal court employment discrimination cases 
resolved at the pretrial stage). 
 105. Levit, supra note 97, at 371, 379–80, 385; Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: 
The Nature of Class Action Employment Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249 (2003) 
(documenting how class actions fail to affect shareholder price or real management change in 
most cases). 
 106. McCormick, supra note 91, at 209–11, 214–22. 
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process, and resolutions are often kept confidential or at least not made 
public.107  The secrecy problem is related to the reliance on litigation to 
enforce the employment discrimination laws.  Because of the expense of 
traditional litigation, many employers look to alternative methods to resolve 
disputes.108  One of these methods has been mandatory, binding arbitration, in 
which the parties agree before any dispute has arisen to waive any right to go 
to court and instead to use an arbitral forum.  In the mid-nineties, the Supreme 
Court endorsed pre-dispute arbitration agreements to resolve discrimination 
claims,109 and many employers have required employees to agree as a 
condition of employment to arbitrate any future disputes.110 Mandatory pre-
 
 107. See Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. 
L. REV. 1, 17 (1987); Laura Macklin, Promoting Settlement, Foregoing the Facts, 14 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 575, 601, 608–09 (1986). 
 108. See Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 668, 668–69 (1986). 
 109. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).  The Court recently 
confirmed that individual employees not only could be required to arbitrate their statutory 
disputes as a condition of employment, but also that a union could waive individual employees’ 
rights to bring a statutory claim in court and agree to arbitration instead.  14 Penn Plaza LLC v. 
Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1469–70, 1474 (2009). 
 110. Several studies have been conducted to try to gauge how many businesses have adopted 
mandatory arbitration.  Those surveys reflected that by the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
approximately fifteen percent of companies had adopted mandatory arbitration.  Alexander J.S. 
Colvin, From Supreme Court to Shopfloor: Mandatory Arbitration and the Reconfiguration of 
Workplace Dispute Resolution, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 581, 588 (2004) [hereinafter 
Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration] (reporting on several surveys); see also KATHERINE V. W. 
STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING 
WORKPLACE 189 (2004) (noting that as of 2004, the number of employees covered by mandatory 
arbitration agreements equaled the number covered by collective bargaining agreements).  A mid-
1990s United States General Accounting Office survey suggested almost all firms with 100 or 
more employees used some method of Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”).  U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/HEHS 95-150, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: MOST 
PRIVATE-SECTOR EMPLOYERS USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 7 (1995), available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=gao&docid=f:he95150.pdf (reporting 
that while only about ten percent of these employers used arbitration, almost ninety percent used 
some form of ADR).  About sixty-four percent of the workforce is employed by employers this 
size or larger.  See Statistics of U.S. Businesses, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2008), http://www2.cen 
sus.gov/econ/susb/data/2008/us_state_ totals_2008.xls.  And the larger the company, the more 
likely it is to have used arbitration.  See Michael H. LeRoy, Getting Nothing for Something: When 
Women Prevail in Employment Arbitration Awards, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 573, 578 n.22 
(2005) (citing Alternative Dispute Resolution: Most Large Employers Prefer ADR as Alternative 
to Litigation, Survey Says, [1997] DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 93, at A4 (May 14, 1997)).  The 
use of arbitration has increased since the late 1990s.  Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, 
Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison, 58 DISP. RESOL. J., 
Nov. 2003–Jan. 2004, at 44, 44.  In his most recent article, Alexander Colvin suggests that nearly 
one quarter of the workforce is covered by pre-dispute arbitration agreements.  Alexander J.S. 
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dispute arbitration for these statutory rights has been attacked, primarily on 
fairness grounds: that employees really have no choice but to agree, that 
employers can write the agreements to benefit themselves, and that arbitrators 
may be more likely to rule in favor of repeat player employers.111  Such 
agreements have been defended with arguments that arbitration is simply a 
change in forum, not in the substantive law to be applied, that the process is 
quicker and less expensive for employees as well, and that employees are more 
likely to win in arbitration than in court.112  The debate will keep empiricists 
busy for years. 
It is not necessary to resolve this debate, though, to call for the solution 
this Article calls for.  In other words, potential unfairness to individual litigants 
is not the only problem, and it is not the problem that this Article is primarily 
concerned with.  The much bigger problem is that arbitration, or any other 
alternative form of dispute resolution the way it is currently structured, for that 
matter, creates a complete lack of public accountability.  The law need not be 
followed in resolving the dispute, and the resolution is usually kept secret, or at 
 
Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 411 (2007) [hereinafter Colvin, Empirical Research]. 
 111. See Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights “Waived” and Lost in 
the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 381, 403, 426 (1996); Alfred W. Blumrosen, 
Exploring Voluntary Arbitration of Individual Employment Disputes, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
249, 254–55 (1983); Julius G. Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 
916, 936 (1979); Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of Public-
Law Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 635, 656 (1995); Lewis Maltby, Paradise Lost–How the 
Gilmer Court Lost the Opportunity for Alternative Dispute Resolution to Improve Civil Rights, 12 
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 4–5 (1994); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: 
Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 682–
83, 685–86 (1996) (discussing the unfairness of arbitration agreements to consumer plaintiffs). 
 112. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26; Colvin, Empirical Research, supra note 110, at 414–19; Jean 
R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1632–34 
(2005) (describing both the level of criticism of mandatory arbitration agreements and their 
expansive use).  Some empirical research supports the assertion that arbitration is a boon for 
employers at the expense of employees, Colvin, Empirical Research, supra note 110, at 414-19, 
423-24, while other empirical research suggests that employees win slightly more often in 
arbitration than they do in litigation, but are awarded less in damages, Lisa B. Bingham, 
Employment Dispute Resolution: The Case for Mediation, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 145, 160 
(2004); Lisa B. Bingham, Is There a Bias in Arbitration of Nonunion Employment Disputes? An 
Analysis of Actual Cases and Outcomes, 6 INT’L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 369 (1995); Theodore 
Eisenberg & Elizabeth T. Hill, Employment Arbitration and Litigation: An Empirical 
Comparison, in ADR & THE LAW: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW: 2003, at 8 (20th ed. 2006); 
Michael H. LeRoy, supra note 110, at 576–77, 589 (asserting that employees tend to win in 
arbitration but the value of the award is much less than what the courts offer); Lewis L. Maltby, 
Employment Arbitration and Workplace Justice, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 105, 114–115 (2003); Lewis 
L. Maltby, The Myth of Second-Class Justice: Resolving Employment Disputes in Arbitration, in 
HOW ADR WORKS 915, 921–22 (Norman Brand ed., 2002). 
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least not made public.113  If the public cannot find out that there has been a 
dispute involving discrimination, what was alleged to have occurred, and what 
the resolution was, the public can neither ensure that the employment 
discrimination norm is being enforced, nor can it tell the nature of the norms 
that are developing—in fact, norms don’t develop. 
Neither the enforcement gap nor the secrecy problem would be especially 
problematic if the disputes we were talking about were really simply disputes 
between two private parties.  If the injured sleep on their rights, they usually 
hurt only themselves.  And if the injured are satisfied with a relatively quick, 
easy, and less expensive system of dispute resolution that needs little in the 
way of public resources, everyone is better off. 
Employment discrimination is not solely a private dispute, however.  The 
harm of employment discrimination reaches beyond the individual employee to 
the group that employee is a member of and to the public at large.  
Discrimination in the aggregate can create a permanent underclass, or keep one 
segment of the population dependent on another.114  Moreover, as the recent 
housing market crash, massive layoffs, government stimulus plans, move for 
health care reform, and impending retirement savings crisis have demonstrated, 
our economy and social welfare system literally depend on effective 
functioning of the system of employment.  Work is the vehicle through which 
we distribute money and social goods.  Thus, because acts of discrimination 
harm the public and the public has so much at stake in labor relations in the 
aggregate, the public has an interest to be vindicated in the enforcement 
 
 113. See Brunet, supra note 107, at 17; cf. Laura Macklin, Promoting Settlement, Foregoing 
the Facts, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 575, 583–601 (1986) (discussing the functions of 
judicial fact-finding, including the requirement of adequate factual proof for judicial action); 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem 
Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 789–93 (1984) (arguing that negotiation frees the parties to reach 
more creative solutions).  But see Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment Disputes Without 
Unions, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 753, 776–78, 786–89, 795–96 (1990) (mentioning some of the 
constitutional problems with using arbitrators to adjudicate disputes involving statutes with 
important public policy goals and concluding that the normal rules of arbitration need not apply 
to such claims to bolster the constitutionality of this form of dispute resolution); Samuel 
Estreicher & Zev J. Eigen, The Forum for Adjudication of Employment Disputes, in Research 
Handbook on the Economics of Labor and Employment Law (manuscript at 12–14) (Michael L. 
Wachter & Cynthia L. Estlund eds. forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa 
pers.cfm?abstract_id=1656618 (arguing that the shortcomings of arbitration can be compensated 
for legislatively, making arbitration a better choice for adjudicating employment discrimination 
claims). 
 114. See David L. Rose, Twenty-Five Years Later: Where Do We Stand on Equal Employment 
Opportunity Law Enforcement, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1130–31 (1989) (outlining the economic 
arguments advanced in favor of Title VII but noting that those who advanced that argument 
concluded by saying that despite the economic justification, prohibiting discrimination in 
employment was “the right thing to do” and an inalienable right). 
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scheme.  In that sense, the regulation of the employment relationship is much 
more like regulation of the securities markets,115 the environment, workplace 
safety, or food and drug safety than it is regulation of individual contractual 
relationships, or discrete individual harms. 
The employment relationship is not regulated like the environment, the 
securities market, workplace safety, or food and drug safety, however.  Those 
systems of regulation include some ex ante barriers to entry: extensive 
reporting requirements, the power to spread the information collected, the 
power to inspect, and some coercive power, including the ability to fine 
regulated parties.116  Instead, our enforcement system for employment 
discrimination law relies primarily on allowing individual employees a private 
right of action to sue employers for discrimination in courts.117  There is very 
little federal oversight except incidentally through the courts when the parties 
choose to air the issues there—the courts themselves may not vindicate the 
public interest, although they do make public important information about the 
dispute. 
We might expect the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”), the agency created to enforce Title VII and given responsibility for 
subsequent antidiscrimination laws as well, to serve that role, but it does not.  
For private sector employment discrimination claims, the EEOC has the power 
to investigate, but it depends primarily on private individuals bringing charges 
to it, rather than on initiating its own investigations.118  Additionally, the 
agency’s investigation is rather thin.119  Although an employer must respond to 
a charge of discrimination and the EEOC can subpoena records, the agency 
does not inspect workplaces, monitor employer behavior, or impose sanctions 
on uncooperative or discriminating employers.120  Even more importantly, the 
 
 115. Linda Hamilton Krieger has made this comparison as well.  Linda Hamilton Krieger, The 
Watched Variable Improves: On Eliminating Sex Discrimination in the Workplace, in SEX 
DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 295, 317–20 (Faye J. 
Crosby et al. eds., 2007). 
 116. I do not mean to suggest that enforcement in these areas is perfect.  See supra note 1. 
 117. See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text. 
 118. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2006). 
 119. The EEOC has, by statute, 180 days to investigate a charge before it must give a 
complainant a right to sue letter.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).  However, a series of cases involving 
early-issued right to sue letters, where the EEOC has certified that it will be unable to complete 
its administrative processing within 180 days suggests that the EEOC does not investigate some 
claims at all.  See Patroski v. Ridge, No. 2:10-cv-967, 2010 WL 5069941, at *8–9 (W. D. Pa. 
Dec. 7, 2010) (holding the EEOC may issue early right to sue letters, but dismissing complaint 
without prejudice for failure to exhaust remedies where the EEOC issued a right to sue letter six 
days after a charge was filed). 
 120. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.15–.17 (2010) (outlining EEOC procedures for investigation of a 
discrimination suit).  See generally EEOC v. Konica Minolta Business Solutions U.S.A., Inc., 639 
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EEOC cannot make public information contained in the charges it receives, nor 
can it reveal much information it gathers from employers who have to file 
compliance reports with it.121 
The EEOC also has little impact on determining when an employee has a 
valid discrimination claim.  It acts as something of a gatekeeper to the courts, 
but it is a very weak one.  An employee has to file a charge with the EEOC 
before the employee can bring a claim in court under Title VII, but the EEOC’s 
analysis of the claim has no bearing on the employee’s ability to pursue the 
matter in court.122  After receiving a charge, the EEOC investigates the claim 
and attempts to conciliate.123  The EEOC also currently has a policy of 
encouraging mediation.124  If those processes fail, the EEOC decides whether 
the facts suggest that the employer discriminated.125  If the EEOC believes the 
employer has discriminated, the EEOC will make a finding to that effect and 
issue a letter to the employee giving the employee a right to sue the employer 
in court.126  While everyone must start with the EEOC, the gate does not close 
once that step has been satisfied.  The EEOC will issue right to sue letters to 
employees where it has not yet completed its investigation and even where it 
has found that the facts do not suggest that the employer discriminated.127  
Only the passage of time will cut off an employee’s ability to get permission to 
sue an employer.128  An EEOC finding thus has no bearing on the ability of an 
employee to bring a claim in court.  Moreover, the action that a person brings 
is not an action to review the EEOC’s judgment about whether the employer 
discriminated, and so no deference is owed the EEOC’s finding of cause or no 
 
F.3d 366, 368, 369 (7th Cir. 2011) (discussing the standard used to judge the reasonableness of 
EEOC subpoena power). 
 121. The EEOC is forbidden from releasing this data by law: 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), 
2000e-8(e).  The Office of Contract Compliance Programs, the agency that enforces federal laws 
incorporated into federal contracts against those contractors, similarly keeps some of this 
information secret, 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.20(g), 60-40.3 (2011), but it can release information from 
employer compliance reports, id. § 60-40.4 (interpreting Title VII’s bar on disclosure to apply 
only to EEOC employees). 
 122. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f). 
 123. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). 
 124. NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION: 
ORGANIZING FOR THE FUTURE 15 (2003). 
 125. See The Charge Handling Process, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/process.cfm 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2011) (stating that the EEOC will close a charge if they decided they 
“probably will not be able to find discrimination”). 
 126. The EEOC can instead decide to bring an action, in which an employee can intervene, 
but the EEOC does so in only a tiny fraction of the charges filed with it.  McCormick, supra note 
91, at 219 (giving figures for the number of cases brought out of the number of charges filed by 
the EEOC). 
 127. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). 
 128. See id. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (requiring a charge to be filed within 180 days after the alleged 
unlawful employer activity). 
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cause even if it has made one in the charge.129  Thus, the EEOC is a gatekeeper 
only in the loosest sense of the word. 
The EEOC is a weak agency in other respects, as well.  It has the power to 
issue regulations, but not substantive interpretive regulations, having the force 
of law.130  Following the EEOC’s regulations gives employers an affirmative 
defense to an action under Title VII,131 but that is the extent of the EEOC’s 
potential to influence employer behavior to prevent discrimination.  Employers 
are not bound to follow the regulations, and the courts rarely defer to those 
regulations.132  And to make matters worse, on the prosecutorial side, the 
EEOC has never been funded enough to bring claims in all or even a 
substantial minority of meritorious cases.133  Additionally, it doesn’t appear 
that the EEOC is any more an expert at assessing discrimination than the courts 
themselves.  A recent study shows that the EEOC system to rate complaints 
according to the likelihood that cause exists to believe the employer 
discriminated did not predict case outcomes in federal court.134  This fact might 
show that the EEOC lacks the expertise to analyze discrimination claims, that 
the federal courts lack that expertise, or that the norm defining discrimination 
is unsettled.  Regardless of the explanation, it demonstrates that the EEOC has 
not been effective at enforcing that norm. 
To remedy the enforcement gap and the secrecy problem, the public needs 
better access to information, more control over development of the 
antidiscrimination norm, and a more effective incentive system to promote 
compliance by employers.  One way to accomplish these goals is to 
consolidate the process of adjudication in a body with expertise in 
discrimination law and expertise in the social sciences, particularly in human 
and organizational behavior and in economics. 
This model is attractive for several reasons.  First, the law on employment 
discrimination is a relatively specialized field, between the complicated proof 
 
 129. Cf. Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1937 (2006) (describing the lack of deference the Supreme Court has given to 
the EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII). 
 130. The EEOC can issue substantive regulations under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2006) and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
12116 (2006). 
 131. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b). 
 132. See Hart, supra note 129, at 1939, 1941–49. 
 133. See 4 U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TEN-YEAR CHECKUP: HAVE FEDERAL AGENCIES 
RESPONDED TO CIVIL RIGHTS RECOMMENDATIONS? 40, 42 (2004), available at http://www.us 
ccr.gov/pubs/10yr04/10yr04.pdf. 
 134. Uncertain Justice: Litigating Claims of Employment Discrimination in the 
Contemporary U.S., RESEARCHING L., Spring 2008, at 4.  Using a large random sampling of 
employment discrimination cases filed between 1988 and 2003, the authors studied the resolution 
of those cases, accounting for the stage of litigation at which they were resolved in addition to the 
substantive outcome.  Id. at 2. 
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structures and the complex theoretical foundation, so that adjudications by 
experts will be more cost effective and lead to more consistent application of 
the law.  Second, enough individuals injured by discrimination have difficulty 
getting relief through the system that expanding the availability of 
adjudications will create greater access to justice.  Third, the consistent 
application of the law and the better dissemination of information will better 
signal to employers what practices constitute discrimination, which will allow 
them to better avoid it. 
What I propose is for Congress to create a new federal agency to, among 
other things, adjudicate private sector discrimination claims.135  Employees 
would have to file charges with the agency, just as they do now, and this 
agency would investigate those charges.  The agency would also be able to 
institute its own investigations.  So far, this is similar to the EEOC functions, 
but unlike the EEOC, the new agency would make public the allegations in the 
charges and the employer’s response to those charges.136  Additionally, it 
would hold hearings, make findings of fact, and conclude whether the law had 
been violated.  If the law had been violated, the agency would clarify what the 
employer could do to comply with Title VII and what remedy the individual 
should be awarded.  The agency’s decision would be subject to ordinary 
administrative review by a federal court, which would have to uphold factual 
findings if based on substantial evidence and would have to accord most legal 
conclusions and recommendations substantial deference.137  The new agency 
would also be empowered to issue regulations with the force of law, codifying 
its interpretation of what the antidiscrimination laws mean and how they 
should be enforced. 
Having a federal agency adjudicate discrimination claims has a number of 
advantages over the current system.  Agencies are created to harness the 
expertise of adjudicators—both legal experts and non-law experts in the 
 
 135. The adjudicative body of the agency would be appointed by the President with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, and members should be balanced by political party.  Members 
should also be balanced by background experience, coming from both the employee and 
employer side.  Finally, members should have some expertise in workplace law, organizational 
psychology, business management, or some other relevant field. 
 136. This would be the default, but there would also have to be a process by which some 
types of information and some proceedings could be kept sealed where privacy interests outweigh 
the public’s need to know.  Sexual harassment cases, for example, are likely to involve highly 
private information and possibly humiliating details.  A harassed employee would have a strong 
interest in not having his or her identity or those details made public.  On the employer side, there 
may be instances in which proprietary information would be revealed.  The employer would have 
a strong interest in keeping that information confidential. 
 137. Based on the expertise of the agency adjudicators, the courts might be encouraged to 
accord the legal recommendations significant deference, similar to that often accorded the 
National Labor Relations Board.  See, e.g., NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 
775, 786 (1990). 
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field—and having experts to decide discrimination cases could bring greater 
coherence to this area of law.  Administrative adjudications also conserve 
scarce judicial resources by allowing non-Article III judges to manage the fact-
finding process in what can be very fact-intensive inquiries.  And using non-
Article III judges can be cost effective, since the adjudicating labor market is 
more flexible, and likely less costly.  Because of this cost savings, more parties 
can have access to the adjudicatory process, creating greater access to that 
process for those who cannot afford or find legal assistance.  Moreover, to the 
extent that the federal courts might be using summary judgment and motions to 
dismiss to rid their dockets of meritorious cases because they dislike this area 
of law,138 having an agency handle this part of the adjudication may remove 
such incentives.139 
Creating a new agency to adjudicate discrimination claims also has 
significant enforcement advantages.  By making the information received by 
the agency public, this scheme would solve much of the problem with the 
secrecy gap.  The public would know more about the allegations of 
discrimination and what is happening at work, which would lead to a better 
picture of whether we are meeting the goal of eliminating workplace 
discrimination.140  Additionally, the public would have a better idea of the 
content of the norm against employment discrimination.  Even if the parties 
agreed to keep the issues confidential, they would not be able to control the 
agency. 
Secrecy might still be achievable by employers; the parties could settle and 
make the matter confidential by acting before the employee went to the 
agency.  That type of secrecy seems less problematic than the type we 
currently have.  If this scheme simply moves the point of optimal settlement to 
a point earlier in the process, employers will work harder to not allow 
employment discrimination to occur or to remedy it as soon as it is brought to 
their attention, before the employee goes to the new agency, creating a greater 
incentive for employers to internalize the antidiscrimination norm, avoiding 
 
 138. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in 
Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 128 n.68 (2009); Joseph A. 
Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment 
Discrimination Cases, 2009 ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1014–15 (2009); Selmi, Hard to Win, supra note 
104, at 558; Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under 
Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 17–18, 32 (2010); cf. Selmi, Proving 
Discrimination, supra note 104, at 283–84, 309 (noting the difficulty of proving discrimination 
and that the Court views the world as “largely unaffected by discrimination”). 
 139. The fact that verdicts in favor of plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases are more 
than six times as likely to be reversed than verdicts in favor of defendants, Clermont et al., How 
Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare supra note 104, at 556–58, 566, makes me a little 
hesitant to even be this optimistic. 
 140. See Krieger, supra note 115, at 318–19. 
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more injuries in the first place and accomplishing the main goal of 
antidiscrimination law. 
By giving the agency a much more direct role in enforcing Title VII, the 
proposal also goes a long way towards closing the enforcement gap.  There 
will still be people who don’t know their rights, but that number is likely to 
shrink the more information is made public about other cases.  There will also 
still be people who are deterred from pursuing their rights, but that too should 
diminish, to some extent, the more settled the norm against discrimination 
becomes.  And with an expert cadre of adjudicators, the norm against 
employment discrimination is likely to form in a more coherent manner, 
creating greater predictability for employers and employees alike. 
Despite these advantages, there are disadvantages and hurdles to having an 
agency adjudicate discrimination claims.  For example, if the EEOC has been 
chronically underfunded,141 there seems little possibility that this new agency 
would be funded adequately to fulfill its mandate.  Similarly, if, as some 
report, employers are well served by the current system in the sense that they 
face little liability for discrimination because of the trend in federal courts,142 
they will not support the creation of a new agency with independent 
enforcement powers.  Additionally, agencies, being less independent from 
influence by market actors than Article III judges and less politically 
accountable than elected officials, may simply carry out the agenda of a small 
minority of actors rather than dispense the justice needed. 
Aside from these pragmatic concerns are legal concerns as well, the 
biggest of which in my view is the focus of this Article: Article III’s 
limitations on the judicial power of the United States and life tenure and salary 
protection for judges. 
III.  APPLYING THE ARTICLE III ANALYSIS TO AGENCY ADJUDICATION OF 
EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES 
So given the analysis the Court has used, the necessary question to ask at 
this point is whether an agency could adjudicate claims in the area to be 
regulated.  To illustrate this analysis, I will go back to the example of 
employment discrimination.  To analyze whether claims of employment 
discrimination could be constitutionally adjudicated by the agency I have 
proposed, we must determine whether discrimination is a private rights issue, 
involving inherently judicial matters.143  If it is not, then the agency could 
adjudicate claims with significant autonomy and little oversight by the Article 
 
 141. See Fiscal Year 2012 Congressional Budget Justification, EEOC, 1–2 (Feb. 2011), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/2012budget.pdf. 
 142. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 143. See supra Part I.A.3. 
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III courts.  If discrimination involves private rights, however, significant 
Article III oversight would be necessary. 
The answer to this question of how much Article III oversight is required is 
complicated.  It requires us to analyze the nature of the right at stake as one 
important data point, which is not an easy task.  I will start by analyzing the 
nature of the employer’s interest, differentiating among different types of 
employers, and then turn to an analysis of the employee’s interest in each 
context. 
Government employers would have no private rights in the sense usually 
discussed, and so analyzing their interests would seem relatively 
straightforward.  This is particularly true for the federal government, suits 
against which would fit into the traditional public rights model.  Thus, having 
an agency adjudicate claims of discrimination by the federal government 
would pose no Article III problems from the federal government’s perspective.  
This is likely why the EEOC currently adjudicates these claims.144 
States would likely also not be considered to have private rights in any 
traditional sense, but states have an interest that is analogous in their immunity 
from suit brought by individuals in federal courts, a right embodied in the 
Eleventh Amendment.145  The Supreme Court has held that states cannot be 
made amenable to suit for damages brought by a private party before a federal 
agency without their consent.146  And so regardless of whether a state’s interest 
as an employer would be characterized as a private right, unconsenting states 
cannot be required to submit to the agency adjudication, at least for money 
damages.  Moreover, this right of the states does not depend on the amount of 
Article III oversight because unconsenting states cannot be brought to federal 
court, either.147  So, these claims might not be appropriate for inclusion in a 
new agency.  States can be sued against their will, however, by the federal 
government, so any action brought by the agency itself, or the Department of 
Justice if that was the prosecutorial arm for enforcement of these kinds of 
cases, could be heard by the agency.  Moreover, state officials can be sued 
against their will for prospective injunctive relief.148  And so an agency might 
 
 144. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b) (2006). 
 145. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 146. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002). 
 147. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 
89, 100 (1984).  Another potential solution to bring states under the authority of the proposed 
agency would be to link consent to the acceptance of federal funds.  Perhaps those federal 
programs already administered by the states could include a provision requiring that employment 
discrimination claims be subject to the agency, or perhaps the statute that creates the agency 
could also provide funding for state antidiscrimination efforts, but include federal agency 
jurisdiction over disputes against states as a condition of that funding. 
 148. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–56 (1908). 
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be able to exercise jurisdiction over all actions against officials for prospective 
relief without much Article III oversight. 
Private employers, whether private individuals or corporate entities, do 
have rights to property and liberty, and so we must examine the nature of those 
rights to determine how much Article III oversight would be required.  Title 
VII, when it was enacted, was revolutionary in many ways.  It was a conscious 
attempt by Congress to change society through legislation.149  When Congress 
prohibited the practice of discrimination by employers, it encroached on what 
had traditionally been nearly sacrosanct: managerial prerogative.  In an 
employment relationship, the law has traditionally protected private employers, 
often on the rationale that they have property and liberty rights in the use of 
 
 149. Joseph P. Witherspoon, Civil Rights Policy in the Federal System: Proposals for a Better 
Use of Administrative Process, 74 Yale L.J. 1171, 1171 (1965); see also ALFRED W. 
BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW: THE LAW TRANSMISSION SYSTEM AND EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY 4 (1993) (arguing that “[t]he effort to ameliorate longstanding patterns of race and 
sex subordination [through Title VII] is perhaps the most ambitious social reform effort ever 
undertaken in America” (emphasis added)); David L. Rose, Twenty-Five Years Later: Where Do 
We Stand on Equal Employment Opportunity Enforcement?, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1129 
(1989) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 16 (1964)) (describing the legislative history of Title VII, 
which made clear the desire for social change).  The House Report that Rose cited noted 
specifically that “[t]oday, more than 100 years after their formal emancipation, Negroes . . . are 
by virtue of one or another type of discrimination not accorded the rights, privileges, and 
opportunities which are . . . the birthright of all citizens.”  H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 18. 
  For a discussion of this evolution in the context of race, see MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, 
FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL 
EQUALITY 426, 432, 435–36, 441 (2004) (arguing that the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 were a reaction by the public to end the violent 
oppression of Blacks); Robert D. Loevy, Introduction: The Background and Setting of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, in THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: THE PASSAGE OF THE LAW THAT ENDED 
RACIAL SEGREGATION 1 (Robert D. Loevy ed., 1997) (describing the evolution of U.S. policy 
from slavery to the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
  The intent of Congress to transform the way that women were treated is not quite as 
clear.  Title VII was originally drafted to prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, 
national origin, and religion, and as a last-minute amendment by a Southern Democrat, proposed 
as a means to defeat the bill, sex was added to the list of prohibited classifications.  110 CONG. 
REC. 2577–84 (1964), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII & XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS 
ACT OF 1964, at 3213–28 (1968); see also RAYMOND F. GREGORY, WOMEN AND WORKPLACE 
DISCRIMINATION: OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO GENDER EQUALITY 23–27 (2003) (describing the 
overt discrimination of women in employment and the evolution of Title VII, but implying that 
banning discrimination on the basis of sex was not really the goal of the statute).  Even though the 
proponent thought that the inclusion of sex would defeat the bill, Representative Martha Griffiths 
(D. Mich.) urged liberal groups to support the amendment, reasoning that some conservatives 
would vote for it because of its proponent, and she could persuade other members of Congress to 
join in; thus Title VII may indeed have been intended to transform how society treated women.  
MARY FRANCES BERRY, WHY ERA FAILED: POLITICS, WOMEN’S RIGHTS, AND THE AMENDING 
PROCESS OF THE CONSTITUTION 61 (1986). 
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their capital.150  They have a right not to have that capital taken away either 
without due process or just compensation, and that property right includes a 
right to use their capital in any way that does not infringe on another person’s 
rights or strongly interfere with the public interest, something that also sounds 
in liberty.151  The employment relationship is a use of capital, and the employer 
decides who should receive payment, for what types of services, and under 
what conditions.  So, an employer deciding not to use capital to hire a 
particular person, or to direct the use of capital to hire particular people, pay 
them a certain amount, and dictate how their jobs should be performed all 
seem to be part of the employer’s property or liberty rights. 
At the same time, those rights are not absolute or unbounded.  Moreover 
the extent of those rights are defined by law.  Congress has ongoing power to 
declare particular uses of property impermissible as infringements on the rights 
of others or as contravening the public interest.  So to the extent that an 
employer would be ordered not to engage in particular practices even as to a 
particular individual from now on, there is no right that has been infringed 
upon in a due process sense.  Congress can prospectively define a property 
right to exclude the prior practice—so long as it does not completely destroy 
the value of the property, take title to real property, or physically take tangible 
property, there is no constitutional problem.152  Thus, an agency award of 
forward-looking relief, an order essentially for an employer to change behavior 
in the future, likely would not need much oversight by an Article III court. 
Declaring that a past action injured a person or violated public policy and 
assessing a criminal penalty or damages seems more clearly to infringe on 
liberty or property, though.  Retrospective relief, relief that seeks to reach back 
 
 150. Employment statutes and cases ground regulation of employers in notions of property in 
capital investment.  They presume that employers retain the discretion to manage their businesses 
and at least part of their business is in deciding whom to hire, what to have employees do, how 
much to pay them, how to treat them, and how, when, and why to discharge them.  See Richard 
A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 953–58 (1984) (grounding 
the at-will presumption in principles of contract and property on broadly economic terms).  Labor 
cases, especially, demonstrate this underpinning.  For example, “[T]he right of a person to sell his 
labor upon such terms as he deems proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of the purchaser 
of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept such labor from the person offering 
to sell it.”  NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 102 (1937). 
  In employment discrimination cases, the economic justification is embodied in the oft-
repeated statement that courts do not sit as super-personnel boards, second guessing the 
employer’s business decisions.  See Charles A. Sullivan, Circling Back to the Obvious: The 
Convergence of Traditional and Reverse Discrimination in Title VII Proof, 46 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1031, 1115–16 & n.337 (2004) (documenting the hundreds of cases that recite this general 
principle). 
 151. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 152. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538–40 (2005) (discussing when 
regulatory action is deemed a taking for Fifth Amendment purposes). 
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in time more clearly takes away an interest that had vested, in the property 
sense, or penalizes conduct that was legal at the time, in a liberty sense.  In a 
property sense, the actor had a settled expectation at the time of action that this 
direction of capital was a part of his or her property right.  In a liberty sense, 
the actor had no notice that his or her conduct would violate any law.  Because 
backward-looking relief likely does involve common law and constitutional 
rights to property and liberty, for an agency to be able to order such relief, that 
agency would likely need significant Article III oversight. 
On the employee side, the issues are a little more ambiguous.  Employees 
are generally not seen to have property rights in future employment except in 
very limited circumstances.153  Thus, where the action that was discriminatory 
was refusing to hire, refusing to promote, demotion, or termination, the 
employee’s property rights will likely be considered not to be affected.  And 
there has never been a liberty interest found in future work for a particular 
employer.154 
At the same time, discrimination is itself an injury to dignity at the least, 
which is some form of property or liberty interest protected by the common 
law and the Constitution,155 which suggests that employees in at least some 
circumstances may also be able to claim a private rights interest.  This may be 
an especially strong claim in the context of government employers.  First, 
sometimes government employees, more often than private employees, have 
property rights in their continued employment, created by contract or statute.156  
And second, even where they do not have property rights, public employees 
have substantive liberty (or equality) rights in not being subject to injury for 
reasons that would violate the Constitution, like because of the employee’s 
race or sex or in retaliation for engaging in First Amendment activity.  Title 
 
 153. A contract will give an employee an enforceable property right or state law might.  State 
tenure laws for teachers or just cause civil service protections for government employees, for 
example, create property rights.  See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 168.114 (2000) (outlining the causes 
by which a permanent public school teacher can be terminated). 
 154. That is not to say that there is no liberty or privacy interest that an employer can injure—
those rights, like reputation, simply don’t extend to continued employment with this particular 
employer. 
 155.  See Jordan J. Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right:  A Jurisprudential Based 
Inquiry Into Criteria and Content, 27 HOW. L.J. 145, 158 (1984) (concluding that human dignity, 
or its equivalent expression, is a fundamental constitutional right and legal principle). 
 156. PATRICIA H. WERHANE ET AL., EMPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYEE RIGHTS 54–55 (2004) 
(noting that about fifty-five percent of private sector workers are at-will while government 
employees generally have some job security); see Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599–600 
(1972) (holding that a public employer may establish a property interest in continued employment 
through its policies and practices); cf. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577–78 (1972) 
(holding that some process would be due an employee who had statutory tenure or a formal 
contract of employment, both of which would give an employee a property right in continued 
employment). 
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VII protects many of these same rights in much the same way.  Thus, to the 
extent that Title VII overlaps with the Constitution and a discrimination claim 
might implicate these rights, a private right of the public employee would 
likely be at stake.  Thus, for federal employees, even though Title VII claims 
are currently adjudicated by an agency, that adjudication may not be 
constitutional to the extent that the Title VII claims are really constitutional 
claims.  And, for state employees, even if the states consented to agency 
adjudication, unconsenting employees likely could not be compelled to 
participate without significant Article III oversight. 
However, there is likely no private rights bar under the current state of the 
law on the private employee side; absent our anti-discrimination laws, there is 
no remedy for discrimination against private employers.  In other words, there 
is no enforceable right to be free from discrimination by private parties on the 
basis of race, sex, national origin, religion, age, or disability founded in either 
the common law or the Constitution.  This dignitary, liberty, or property 
interest has generally been protected only by statute. 
Overall then, Title VII and the other employment discrimination statutes 
do not fall perfectly into the public rights/private rights categories.  They 
involve both.  Given that for at least some types of remedies, and some types 
of parties, a private right might be at stake in adjudication of discrimination, 
we turn next to the remedies currently available under Title VII to see how 
much Article III oversight might be needed. 
When it was enacting Title VII, Congress could have made a number of 
different choices.  It could have criminalized employment discrimination, but it 
chose not to do that.157  It could have conditioned some sort of license to do 
business on compliance with rules designed to prevent employment 
discrimination, and an agency could have regulated the licensing process.158  It 
could have given primary enforcement power to an agency, allowing no 
private right of action at all.  Conversely, it did not need to create an agency, 
but instead could simply have given employees private rights of action along 
with damages and other remedies, leaving to those private parties all 
enforcement through litigation in state and federal courts.  None of these 
options would have posed constitutional problems. 
 
 157. Julie C. Suk suggests how the U.S. system might look if it had instead chosen to 
criminalize employment discrimination, comparing Congress’ choice with the choice in France to 
make employment discrimination a criminal issue.  Julie C. Suk, Procedural Path Dependence: 
Discrimination and the Civil-Criminal Divide, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1315 (2008). 
 158. Although states are generally the ones with the police power to require these types of 
licenses, Congress would likely also have the power through the Commerce Clause.  As long as 
the business regulated had enough connection to interstate commerce, and given how loosely that 
is defined, it is likely that every business does have some connection to interstate commerce, the 
Commerce Clause would allow Congress to regulate it. 
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The choice that Congress did make mixed many of these elements.  
Congress created an agency to enforce the statute, the EEOC, but gave it very 
limited powers.159  “Originally, the EEOC was empowered only to provide 
technical assistance, to investigate, and to attempt conciliation; it could not 
prosecute charges of discrimination and could not adopt substantive 
interpretive regulations.”160  Individuals had a private right of action from the 
start, however.161  And “[i]n 1972, the EEOC was given the power to prosecute 
actions in federal court,” independent of any right of action the individual 
employee might have, “in order to provide for more effective enforcement.”162  
Additionally, coverage was extended to state and local governments.163 
And the remedies were somewhat limited as well.  The statute originally 
allowed courts to order injunctive relief including instatement or reinstatement, 
back pay, and “such [other] affirmative action as may be appropriate.”164  But 
by creating a private right of action against employers, Congress created the 
potential for private rights disputes, which would suggest that Article III courts 
would have to have substantial oversight.  Still, by limiting remedies to back 
pay, reinstatement, and other forms of equitable remedies,165 Congress limited 
the potential agency action to awarding only relief that would not infringe on 
any vested rights to property or liberty, which made it possible that an agency 
could act without Article III supervision.  In other words, even though 
employees had a private right of action against employers, something that 
would likely implicate a private employer’s private right, a public employee’s 
private right, or a state’s sovereignty interest, because the relief available was 
 
 159. See supra notes 99, 118–29 and accompanying text. 
 160. McCormick, supra note 91, at 202; see also id. at 202 n.52 (discussing the EEOC’s 
enforcement powers). 
 161. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(e), 78 Stat. 241, 260 (1964) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (2006)). 
 162. McCormick, supra note 91, at 202 (citing Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 
Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103; Statement about Signing the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Act of 1972, PUB. PAPERS 105 (Mar. 25, 1972) (“Everyone familiar with the operation of title VII 
over the past 7 years has realized that the promise of that historic legislation would remain 
unfulfilled until some additional, broad-based enforcement machinery was created.  This bill 
provides that enforcement capability.”)).  “The EEOC also has the power to adjudicate federal 
claims, but not adjudicate private sector disputes.”  McCormick, supra note 91, at 202 n.53. 
 163. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16c. 
 164. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(g) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)). 
 165. It is unclear whether back pay is an equitable remedy or some kind of damages remedy.  
Before compensatory damages were available, some argued that back pay was not equitable and 
that jury trials had to be available for Title VII suits.  Once the Civil Rights Act of 1991 made 
compensatory and punitive damages, and also jury trials, available, those arguments were no 
longer necessary.  Most recently, the issue has again arisen in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 
S. Ct. 2541 (2011), where the issue is whether the plaintiff class by seeking back pay is seeking 
only injunctive relief for class action certification purposes. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 
18–21, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (No. 10–277). 
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only prospective, there was likely little constitutional problem with having a 
federal agency adjudicate the claim with little Article III oversight. 
Additionally, by allowing the Attorney General, and later the EEOC, to 
pursue civil cases of individual or “pattern or practice” discrimination on 
behalf of the government, for which equitable relief could be awarded,166 
Congress established a system of public rights as between employers and the 
government.  And so, from the start, Congress could have designed the EEOC 
to adjudicate claims of discrimination, at least those brought by the 
government as prosecutor, and likely even those brought by employees 
because of the only available remedy, as long as there was some way to review 
the decision in an Article III court. 
In 1991, Congress amended Title VII to allow for damages to be 
awarded.167  When it did that, it may have foreclosed the possibility that it 
could have an agency adjudicate any discrimination claims seeking damages 
on behalf of an employee.  A declaration of liability for past conduct and 
retrospective relief would most likely infringe on an employer’s private right, 
and suits for money damages would implicate state sovereignty rights. 
Analysis of the nature of right at stake or the type of remedy available tells 
us only that some Article III oversight is necessary; it does not determine the 
level of Article III oversight necessary.  We still must look to the courts’ 
structural interests.  Structural interests are evaluated by gauging the level of 
infringement on the ordinary work of the federal courts.168  We look primarily 
at the scope of the subject-matter jurisdiction of the proposed agency for this 
analysis.  On the one hand, the jurisdiction might seem to be fairly narrow—
simply violations of federal antidiscrimination laws. 
However, the subject of employment discrimination is not nearly as 
narrow, nor the workplace nearly as regulated, as was the situation in either 
Thomas or Schor.  In both situations, there was no background right to engage 
in the conduct the regulated parties had engaged in.169  Congress had created 
barriers to enter into the field at all.  The workplace is not like that.  Anyone 
can become an employer simply by paying another for a service.  And there are 
very few limits on that transaction.  Moreover, the background rule of at-will 
employment, that an employer can refuse to hire or fire a person for a good 
reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all, means that this exception is actually 
incredibly narrow.  And other workplace laws, like wage and hour laws, 
workplace safety laws, collective bargaining laws, and employee benefits taxes 
 
 166. This power was transferred to the EEOC by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 5, 86 Stat. 103, 107 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-6(e)). 
 167. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072–73 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a). 
 168. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text. 
 169. See supra notes 56–59, 72–74 and accompanying text. 
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and laws do not regulate how an employer may employ someone in such a 
comprehensive sense that they consist of barriers to entry into the field of 
employment.  Moreover, discrimination claims often overlap with claims under 
other statutes or common law contract or tort remedies. 
Thus, there seems to be more of an encroachment on the regular work of 
the judicial branch than in the cases in which the Supreme Court has upheld 
the use of non-judicial actors with little Article III oversight.170  At the same 
time, though, barring giving the new agency jurisdiction over state common 
law claims that might be related to the adverse employment action, like 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, discharge in violation of public 
policy, or breach of contract, the subject-matter jurisdiction is substantially 
more narrow than that of the Bankruptcy Courts invalidated by the Court in 
Northern Pipeline.171  And if the structural interest in the subject matter is 
gauged by the federal courts’ interest in the kinds of cases at stake,172 federal 
courts seem to have very little interest in discrimination cases.173  Likely, the 
jurisdiction would be considered narrow enough not to infringe too far on the 
structural interests of the federal courts. 
One last consideration is mandated by the Supreme Court’s Article I cases: 
the individual interest in having private rights adjudicated by an Article III 
court.  If the adjudication would implicate a private right at all, the individual 
has some right of access to Article III courts.174  Likely this individual interest 
in access to an Article III court would be implicated enough that at the very 
least, consent by all private and all state employers subject to actions for 
damages and by government employees in all cases would be necessary. 
And so what does this mean for design for the agency?  Making the 
process optional would be one way to comply with Article III.  It is likely that 
making the process optional will mean that it is never used, however.  
Employers have little incentive to agree to have a claim considered by an 
 
 170. See supra Part I.A. 
 171. See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text. 
 172. I draw on Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing, 
545 U.S. 308 (2005) and Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986) 
for an analogy here.  Both of those cases concerned when a state-created cause of action might be 
considered to arise under federal law for purposes of statutory federal question jurisdiction.  
Grable, 545 U.S. at 310; Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 805.  Part of the test is how important the 
federal interest at issue is, and that is gauged in part, it seems, by how much the federal courts 
would be interested in that type of case.  See Grable, 545 U.S. at 315; Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 
814–16, 814 n.12. 
 173. See Scott A. Moss, Judicial Hostility to Litigation and How It Impairs Legal 
Accountability for Corporations and Other Defendants, AM. CONST. SOC’Y 3–10 (May 2010), 
http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/ACS%20Issue%20Brief%20-%20Moss%20Judicial%20 
Hostility.pdf (discussing the procedural hurdles facing discrimination plaintiffs). 
 174. See supra notes 27–30. 
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agency when the courts so frequently rule in their favor.175  Agency 
proceedings will be less expensive, but that does not, by itself, appear to be 
enough incentive.  The EEOC for some time has been promoting its mediation 
program.176  It has had great difficulty getting employers to participate, 
however, because they see little validity in the employee’s complaint and 
believe that they have little to lose by refusing.177  If they refuse, the chances 
that the employee will sue are very small, and so even the prospect of legal 
fees is not enough to justify the expense of the agency proceedings.  
Additionally, even if an employee does sue, the chances of the employee 
surviving a motion to dismiss or summary judgment are very small, and of 
surviving appeal if they win, also small.178 
At this point, a reader might be wondering why the answer is not simply to 
provide for extensive judicial review.  Ways to do that might be to make it 
more like the process of the National Labor Relations Board, in that the 
agency’s order in favor of an employee would not be self-executing.179 
Employees would have to seek payment of damages or issuance of an 
injunction in federal court based on the agency’s factual findings and 
recommendations.  For findings in which private employers were found not to 
have discriminated, there might need to be little Article III oversight.  As an 
alternative to the enforcement proceeding, perhaps, employees could seek 
judicial review of the agency’s decision in federal court, and employers could 
seek review rather than comply if they were found to have discriminated.  That 
review might be very searching, considering the matter de novo.  If the review 
route were taken or if the employer failed to comply with the recommendations 
without seeking review, either the agency or the employee would be able to go 
to court to seek sanctions for that failure to comply. 
That extensive judicial review would seem to eviscerate most of the 
reasons to create an agency adjudicator in the first place.  The proceedings will 
be more efficient and less costly (at least for the courts) if Article III judges are 
not overseeing the process of managing discovery, taking evidence, and 
mediating pre-trial motions.  However the courts will still have many cases to 
decide if review is practically automatic.  Additionally, to the extent that the 
process seeks to harness the expertise of the decision maker or more clearly set 
norms, if the courts have free reign, and don’t agree with the agency’s views of 
 
 175. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 176. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 177. E. Patrick McDermott et al., An Investigation of the Reasons for the Lack of Employer 
Participation in the EEOC Mediation Program, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate/study3/in 
dex.html (last modified Dec. 10, 2003). 
 178. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 179. NLRB v. P*I*E Nationwide, Inc., 894 F.2d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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the norm (much like the current climate with the EEOC), then the agency 
won’t be able to serve that function. 
Another solution that would not suffer from either weakness might be to 
change the system entirely to be more like workers’ compensation insurance.  
Discrimination has been likened to a dangerous condition on land,180 and so 
perhaps that analogy is useful.  If discrimination is likely, perhaps employers 
should have to pay into a sort of discrimination insurance fund.  The amounts 
due the fund would be determined by an agency based on findings of 
discrimination—the more discrimination claims that are found to be valid per 
employee, the higher the contribution required per employee.  Employees who 
believed they had been discriminated against could apply to the fund, and the 
agency would determine whether they had, and how much they were due as a 
result, paying from the fund.  Perhaps for particularly egregious instances, the 
employer would also be subject to civil fines, which would go into the fund.  
This system, at least in the private sector would appear to avoid the private 
right problem entirely. 
The problem with this system is that the structural changes that injunctive 
relief could provide would have to be provided for in some separate process.  
Orders for structural change that are closely monitored appear to be the most 
effective means of eliminating discrimination and transforming workplace 
norms,181 so this could be a big loss of efficiency in accomplishing that 
function of the employment discrimination laws.  However, that may be offset 
by a gain prompted by removing some of the stigma of what it means to 
discriminate.  Workers’ compensation is in some sense a no-fault system.182  
Accidents happen.  Much of the current debate about discrimination is whether 
implicit bias, the biases that we all have and that are exercised sometimes 
below the level of fully-self aware consciousness, should be the kind of 
discrimination made illegal by the employment discrimination laws.  Being a 
discriminator carries a huge stigma, which is part of the reason that people 
resist admitting that they might discriminate.  Removing fault for at least this 
kind of discrimination might lessen the stigma in a way that would allow 
people to reflect on their implicit biases.  And it could do so in a way that 
would still acknowledge that the person discriminated against was harmed and 
would provide a remedy for that harm. 
Another way to divide the adjudication is to focus on the type of remedy.  
Perhaps the agency’s order regarding liability and awarding equitable relief 
would be self-executing, but any damages portion would have to be brought to 
 
 180. Marc R. Poirier, Is Cognitive Bias at Work a Dangerous Condition on Land?, 7 EMP. 
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 459, 464 (2003). 
 181. Levit, supra note 97, at 427. 
 182. See Howard Delivery Serv., Inc., v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 651, 655 (2006) 
(describing workers’ compensation as a no-fault policy). 
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a federal court for enforcement.  That too would likely not involve any private 
right being finally adjudicated by the agency and would also limit the scope of 
review the federal courts could exercise over much of the decision.  But again, 
we would lose a significant amount of the efficiency gains of bringing the 
claims together in one action. 
CONCLUSION 
Article III is not the only potential constitutional barrier to agency 
adjudication.  Other constitutional provisions would have to be considered as 
well.  Due process is likely not a problem as long as the agency process 
provides for notice, an opportunity to be heard, and minimizes the risk of 
erroneous deprivation.183  In theory, there might at some point be a substantive 
due process or equal protection problem with carving out particular claims or 
claims of suspect classes for special treatment, although the courts have not yet 
confronted that issue.  Additionally, if the agency awards damages, the 
Seventh Amendment will likely be implicated.184  But for the most part, these 
issues will likely be approached as a matter of balancing with a threshold 
consent requirement analogous to the balancing that the article III analysis 
requires us to engage in. 
For most of the types of regulatory reform that are on our national agenda 
for which adjudication will seem a possible regulatory solution, it is likely that 
some form of private right will be at stake.  While there will likely be no 
absolute bar, then, to the use of adjudication, the key will be to create enough 
incentive for parties to consent to the system’s use, or to rethink the regulatory 
system more broadly to restructure what might be considered private rights 
into a more clearly public rights framework.  This paper begins to outline ways 
that might be done. 
  
 
 183. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333–35 (1976) (using a balancing test to 
evaluate what process is due in connection with a deprivation of a public right); Goldberg v. 
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262–66 (1970) (using a balancing test to determine whether certain 
procedural protections were required before welfare benefits could be terminated even with 
administrative review afterwards). 
 184. See Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 51–55 (1989).  The question of 
whether a jury is governed by the same public right/private right distinction as used in Article III, 
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proceedings.  In Granfinanciera, the Court reserved the question of whether, a jury trial being 
required, a non–Article III decision maker could oversee such a jury trial.  Id. at 64.  That 
question remains unresolved.  See, e.g., In re Grabill Corp., 967 F.2d 1152, 1158 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(holding bankruptcy courts do not have the power to conduct jury trials); In re Ben Cooper, Inc., 
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